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Introduction
The world and business are connected and a business does not exist today that does not have
potentially thousands of connections to the Internet in addition to the thousands of connections to
other various parts of its own infrastructure. That is the nature of the digital world we live in and there is
no chance the number of those interconnections will reduce in the future. Protecting from the “outside”
world with a perimeter solution might have been enough to reduce risk to an acceptable level in an
organization 20 years ago, but today’s threats are sophisticated, persistent, abundant, and can come
from pretty much anywhere: a hostile nation-state, a hacker in their parents’ basement, a disgruntled
system admin, an unsuspecting accountant victim, and countless others. The methodologies and
principles of perimeter-based protections of yesteryear must be constricted down to the resource level
and constantly evaluated for risk in order to be effective today and into the future…and that constriction
comes in the form of zero trust. We must no longer solely focus on protecting the perimeter of the
network but take that same mentality and make that perimeter protection applicable to every user,
resource, service, and asset within operation in our enterprise and our cloud services.
Greenfield organizations are able to architect zero trust principles into their systems from origin,
giving them a faster path to full adoption and incorporation into their business processes.
Unfortunately, existing enterprises do not have this luxury but must begin the journey of transitioning to
this new realm of cybersecurity practice. This research paper is intended to manage expectations of
implementing zero trust and what benefits can be derived from it and what risks can and will exist
during and after implementation. I will create a common understanding of what zero trust really is, and
what it is not, and explore a proposed framework that can be used for an organization to plan and
implement zero trust. The term “zero trust” is a misnomer. There cannot be systems and
communication (required for a digital business to operate) if there is no trust between systems sharing
information. What the term “zero trust” is really saying is that there is no implied trust in data access
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and communications. Transactions and access are constantly verified that the requestor is genuinely
who they indicate themselves to be, and they are authorized to do what they are intending to do. To
clarify understanding of the past paradigm to what we are referencing in zero trust, we can associate
and reference a family and their home. The aforementioned perimeter protection was how our homes
looked in 1950’s television shows where the most protection a home needed was a lock on the front
door. Everyone in the home was trusted, Mom was always home keeping an eye on things, the kids
were good and could run freely around the house with full access to everything and there was no
threats or impacts to anything inside the house, so long as the front door was locked and only Dad had
the keys to the lock in order to traverse that perimeter.
In today’s world, there are threats of “bad guys” coming in the windows, hiding in the basement
for months, spy satellites overwatching activity, locks being picked, the kids might want to “explore”
Dad’s liquor cabinet or access unauthorized applications on the TV or computer, and some kids might
have gone awry and decide they are going to slowly steal from the family. Keeping the modern home
(i.e., corporate network) safe from all of these possible threats is to remove the incentive and
opportunity from the adversaries and make it so they cannot accomplish their malicious goals, or, if they
do start to succeed, that unauthorized activity is confined to the specific incident and has no chance of
spreading throughout the house.
What is “Zero Trust”
The term “zero trust” is powerful and catchy and makes for a strong marketing term. In the past
year, to my ears and what I hear in the cybersecurity realm, is that zero trust is the saving grace of all
things cybersecurity. That is where all organizations need to get to as fast as possible if they want to be
more secure and protected against threats than they have ever been and President Joe Biden even
issued Executive Order 14028 requiring federal civilian agencies to establish plans to drive adoption of
Zero Trust Architecture by 2024. To an outsider of cybersecurity but someone who happens to work in
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the Information Technology field, zero trust is the holy grail of Security Architecture. But the term “zero
trust” is much more than a marketing term and has a lot more substance behind the definition. NIST
(National Institute of Standards and Technology) defines Zero Trust (ZA) and Zero Trust Architecture
(ZTA) as follows [1]:
Zero trust (ZT) provides a collection of concepts and ideas designed to minimize uncertainty in
enforcing accurate, least privilege per-request access decisions in information systems and
services in the face of a network viewed as compromised. Zero trust architecture (ZTA) is an
enterprise’s cybersecurity plan that utilizes zero trust concepts and encompasses component
relationships, workflow planning, and access policies. Therefore, a zero trust enterprise is the
network infrastructure (physical and virtual) and operational policies that are in place for an
enterprise as a product of a zero trust architecture plan.
NIST Special Publication 800-207 on zero trust architecture is referenced in many of the research
documents which contribute to my understanding of zero trust architecture I discuss in this paper and
many of the principles and recommendations included within. I respect and hold in the highest regard as
I reference them throughout my research, but I think their definition is a bit complex and would not
create the right visual representation of zero trust and zero trust architecture to, for example, a
company executive. The key words missing from these definitions are implicit and explicit. Zero trust
“concepts and ideas” that NIST is implying in their definition mean zero implicit trust and using constant
authentication and authorization decisions at every interaction point in the network to grant riskappropriate, explicit trust. To me, that is a more streamlined, accurate, and impactful definition.
Implementing zero trust architecture is founded on the idea that every “other” asset, resource,
or user is hostile and your system is already compromised. Every system and access to every bit of data
must be protected as if it is under attack by the resource right next to it. In our home example, that
liquor cabinet is not going to implicitly accept that the person opening the door is Dad just because Dad
lives there and the house has locks on the front door. That liquor cabinet is going to make Dad verify he
is “Dad” and provide multiple authentication factors (password, biometric, etc.) that will be verified by
an independent third party (This will be the policy engine and policy administrator in the control plane
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we will discuss later) before Dad gets access to the liquor cabinet. Drunk Uncle Earl and 9-year old Billy,
even when they are within the perimeter of the house, do not meet the criteria necessary (the privilege)
to be able to access the cabinet and their attempts will fail and an alert will be sent to Dad. In zero trust,
access is never implied. It is only explicitly granted after a review of the authorization of the access being
allowed and verification of the entity trying to access, and this review happens constantly to verify that
the explicit access given at a certain timestamp is still prudent and relevant at time n+timestamp.
What is Not “Zero Trust”
In my organization I have personally heard use of the term “zero trust network” interchangeably
with “network segmentation”. Other cybersecurity analysts have described the principle of least
privilege and called it zero trust and others have referenced Enterprise Security Risk Management
synonymously as zero trust. In my research, all of these are components that can work together to
achieve the goals of zero trust, but they are not conclusive and comprehensive to the degree of
matching the definition I described above. Those items are singular components of our journey that will
be discussed in this research and applied to the framework I am proposing for a company to build a
program around adopting zero trust. Zero trust architecture is a huge set of design principles that are
applied at multiple levels of the enterprises’ systems: including aspects of identity management,
encryption, access management, monitoring, data transport, sessions, and configuration management.
For example, network segmentation is a form of intermediary filtering [2] where the traffic can flow
between hosts within different vlan networks but must traverse a firewall for the East-West traffic and
abide by the rules stipulated in those firewalls. This is a good contribution to zero trust architecture, but
it still misses the host filtering component. So as long as the connection between the vlans meets the
firewall parameters, the trust just became implied to the entire receiving network segment, and all of its
hosts, and a key principle of zero trust was not achieved. Zero trust architecture is much more
comprehensive and involved than looking at any single effort dealing with network equipment, server
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hardware, applications, hypervisors, PKI (Public Key Infrastructure), IAM/IGM (Identity
Access/Governance Management), Active Directory, or configuration management…it takes application
of all of these working together.
There is no single tool or platform that can be installed by the enterprise to accomplish zero
trust. For a technologist, this can be difficult to ingest. Surely someone has packaged up a suite of
products they can market under one umbrella that can accomplish the goals of zero trust, right? No,
that is not the case. It is important to remember that accomplishing zero trust is the application of
design principles to accomplish a goal. The goal of any cybersecurity initiative should be to support and
protect business operations. If it is not important to the business, then it should not be a cybersecurity
investment. NIST SP 800-160 recommends using NIST SP 800-37 on Risk Management Framework as the
steps to introduce zero trust architecture into an existing perimeter-based architected network [1], but I
would take it one step further, as we will discuss in the next section as I develop my own zero trust
architecture framework.
Getting Started
First, we begin with logistics and where we left off. Using the NIST Risk Management Framework
(RMF) as a catalyst point to survey the assets, users, data flows, and business workflows of the
organization. This will be the foundation of preparing the organization for zero trust implementation
planning. The RMF steps of Prepare, Categorize, Select, Implement, Assess, Authorize, and Monitor may
already be in effect in an organization independent of any zero trust initiative, but the foundations are
very sound and extremely applicable to beginning the journey into zero trust. Gilman and Barth
explicitly state that the first steps to implementing zero trust is to diagram all network flows [2], as they
follow an RFC-style prioritization list for defining scope of zero trust networking which prioritizes that
“All network flows MUST be authenticated before being processed” [2]. In my opinion, scoping the
execution of the “what” (network flows) does not happen first. Zero trust is not a bolt-on solution to an

5|Page

existing network, so planning an approach to systematically connect the design principles of zero trust
to the goals of the organization is critical. I would recommend the NIST SP 800-160v2 [3] constructs
approach to developing Cyber Resilient Systems. This approach is grounded in defining Design
Principles, which is exactly what zero trust architecture is! By articulating the design principles of zero
trust and then tailoring and mapping those to NIST-defined or self-defined later constructs, then a zero
trust-specific framework can be constructed using this established model. The zero trust design
principles influence implementation approaches (which is the “what” that Gilman and Barth were
describing). Those approaches influence the Techniques which the organization plans to utilize. NIST has
defined families for techniques in SP 800-160v2 but in developing our custom structure for zero trust
architecture, the techniques would be the people, processes, and tools which will support the next layer
up, the Objectives.
Zero trust is accomplished not through one suite of applications purchased through a vendor, it
is the seamless integration and constant communication of a multitude of tools and systems all
contributing their part to the architecture as a whole. The techniques section of this framework is where
we ensure that we have the proper tools implemented (or planned), processes to support the
implementation while keeping the business operational, and the people to make this all possible per the
requirements of the design principles and to execute on the implementation approaches in support of
accomplishing the objectives. Moving up the framework to the Objectives the techniques will support is
where we will track our metrics and KPIs towards accomplishing our goals of zero trust. The goals of zero
trust are directly influenced by the Business’ Risk Management Strategy! We will have clear priority of
the goals of the multi-year, incremental zero trust implementation effort because those exact goals are
driven from the organizations’ risk tolerance and strategy for managing risk.
How do we define the objectives to get from the execution of the techniques up to the goals?
This answer lies in overlaying the CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model five pillars of implementation. The
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pillars of Identity, Device, Network/Environment, Application Workload, and Data [4] all include various
functions that can be rated for maturity as “Traditional”, “Advanced”, or “Optimal”. There can be
diminishing returns for an organization to strive for “Optimal” of every function of every pillar
(objective), but with clearly defined goals we will be able to determine the correct maturity level of each
objective and measure our progress towards the company’s goals regarding zero trust. The marriage of
these models to apply to initiating the implementation of zero trust architecture is displayed in Figure 1.
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assets, network infrastructure application/service, and the requesting
security posture of all owned dynamic and strictly
and communications and uses
asset—and may include other
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enforced before
it to improve its security
behavioral and environmental
access is allowed.
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Figure 1: Applying CISA Cyber Security Model with NIST Cyber Resiliency Constructs to Implement Zero
Trust Architecture
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Trust and Decision Architecture
Zero trust architecture uses identity and the context around the identity of a subject to manage
adaptive trust decisions. Zero trust is all about creating point-in-time explicit trust for certain access at a
certain moment and in doing so, it must have the tools and data available immediately for the policy
administrator to determine a subject claim of identity. And since a huge part of subjects (anything
trying to access the resources of another thing) is humans, a robust identity access foundation is critical
for success [5]. The “source of truth” of John Doe actually being “John Doe” and various attributes about
him being accurate and available at all times to help the policy administrator is the heart of zero trust
and the first pillar of our Objectives for our custom Zero Trust Framework from Figure 1. Later in this
paper we will operate a case study for John Doe from the Design Principles all the way up through the
Identity Objective to accomplish a Risk Management Strategy goal.
Zero trust architecture uses existing tools and technologies in concert with each other for them
all to contribute to the overall protection of the enterprise. Some of these tools might sound familiar in
an implicit-trust, perimeter-based network of today. Use some firewalls and some IPS/IDS at the
perimeter and then some EDR tools on endpoints and ultimately send all logs to a SIEM for analysis and
alerting? Maybe implement some IPSec tunneling and even use mutually authenticated TLS (Transport
Layer Security) for internal encryption flows and enable encryption of data at rest on the SAN? All of
these technology implementations are good ideas and very necessary and valuable to any given network
and are still relevant during and after implementation of zero trust. Where the technical
implementation and sometimes novel use of security technology is differentiated in a zero trust network
is the existence, reliance, and importance of something called the control plane and the data plane. The
control plane is the heart and soul of zero trust architecture and this is where the information gathered
and supplied by all other cybersecurity tools, alongside Identity Management tools, Asset information,
configuration information, SIEM, Continuous Diagnostics and Monitoring tools, and many others are
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collected and contribute to the policies that ultimately are executed on the decisions based on this
information. The control plane will likely become a Crown Jewel of the organization and will require the
utmost attention and protection, as these are the logical components of an on-premise or cloud-based
service which operate independently outside of the traditional data flow network (that segregation is
tremendously important) yet makes all of the decisions regarding access to resources in that data flow
network. The control plane includes two critical features of zero trust architecture: The policy engine
(PE) and the policy administrator (PA). Collectively, these two are referenced as the policy decision point
(PDP), which as the name describes, makes all the decisions about if and how network resources are
going to connect to each other and if they are going to be successful in doing so. Once the decision is
made by the policy administrator, that decision is passed to the data plane (which resides on that
aforementioned data flow network) where the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) enables the freshlyestablished trusted relationship between the subject and the resource, monitors it, and eventually
terminates it per the request sent from the policy administrator (See Figure 2) [1].

Figure 2: Core Zero Trust Logical Components [NIST SP 800-207]
What does the policy engine do with all of this ingested information and data about subjects in
order to feed the policy administrator what it needs to make a decision on granting or denying access to
a resource? It uses a Trust Algorithm (TA). The Trust Algorithm I like to think of as the calculation of a
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trust score. Various inputs of information are fed to the PE and each one holds a certain value. Does the
user exist? Did they provide MFA credentials in their request? Are they requesting a connection from a
known corporate device? Was the connection initiated via an encrypted tunnel originating from a TPMenabled device? Is it normal work time? Is it the same time as this user and device have tried to access
this resource before? All of these and many more questions ultimately lead the PE to calculate a certain
“trust score” for the connection and if a certain threshold of a trust score is met as per required for the
resource, the PA allows the PEP to create the connection. Certain resources may require different trust
scores in order to gain access, just as certain trust scores of subjects (maybe a new or transferred
employee), may prompt for additional input in order to raise their score high enough to access a
resource. This all occurs very dynamically and the PE must be executing those various trust algorithms
against every request that flows through the network.
Risks
Due to the complexity and collaborative nature of disparate systems communicating extensively
in real time to make expedient decisions on access and privilege based on a multitude of factors from
every user, device, and resource on the network, there is very high risk to impacting business operations
during and after implementation of zero trust. False positives could inundate the systems’ monitors and
alerts and reflect a failure in the architecture, but more impactfully it could prevent an authorized user
from retrieving needed data to run the business. In a zero trust network, there are going to be possibly
thousands of opportunities to block valid users and resources from performing valid business functions.
Since the purpose of cybersecurity is to support the business and contribute to the bottom line either in
the form of revenue protection or cost prevention, implementing a cybersecurity solution which
negatively impacts the business operations is just not acceptable. Additionally, as mentioned before in
the many thousands, or possibly millions, of Trust Algorithms which must be processed by the policy
engine and decided upon by the policy administrator in the control plane and then sent to the Policy
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Enforcement Point to establish and terminate the connection, a bottleneck can come to fruition quite
quickly and bring the data transport at the organization to its’ knees. Having to make a data-informed
decision automatically and then execute on blocking or creating the connection at the speed of business
is not only at risk when it fails, but also at risk when it does not scale at the speed of the demand.
Zero trust architecture is also not a magic shield of protection from every malicious activity
possible. An unaware accountant might still click on a phishing link and deploy malware into the
network. Zero trust will likely contain the blast radius of the malware and prevent it at various steps of
the cyber kill chain, but malware infection can still happen. Supply chain compromises of hardware,
depending on the status of the TPM chip (Trusted Platform Module) and hypervisor vulnerabilities can
undermine the separation of the data and control planes, where policy is going to be centralized and
enforced. Encryption technologies required for zero trust implementations may make monitoring and
anomaly detection more complex, and deep packet inspection impossible. A compromised system may
be able to use that same encryption to hide malicious activity from detection. Legacy applications and
even organizational resistance can prevent implementation of the required components of zero trust
and even create the vulnerability necessary to exploit the network and “hide” from the very protections
zero trust is meant to enable. Additionally, zero trust is protecting all of the individual resources on the
enterprise network, so it does not come into effect when the organization is hit with a DDos attack. Zero
trust focuses on authentication and authorization, and thus a high volume connection-request attack
such as DDos will still require additional focused protections outside the control plane and data plane of
zero trust.
Deeper Technical Requirements and Recommendations
Zero trust architecture requires that all communication requests are expected and data is
protected by the best encryption possible, at rest and in transit. Transit can be tricky, as there must be a
fully established trust chain created to ensure that the origin source of the data, the transport medium,
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and the recipient of the data all are trusted that no gaps were left unclosed in their communication and
inadvertently affect the confidentiality or integrity of the data. X.509 certificates are a popular and
preferred choice for authenticating TLS (Transport Layer Security) connections. Mutually authenticated
TLS is the recommended communication protocol for internal client/server connections within the
enterprise [2], as it is supported by most Application Layer protocols. Side note, although complex and
potentially expensive, for true transport defense in depth a company can use mutually authenticated
TLS in addition to IPsec (Layer 7 in addition to Layer 3) [2] but to save on costs it is recommended to use
IPSec in transport mode for server to server interactions, or UDP encapsulation for networks which do
not support IPSec. Certificates like X.509 use a public and a private key, where the public key is
distributed and the private key is held as a secret. The private key is required to decrypt a cipher that
was encrypted by the public key. This ensures that the data is not decrypted by anyone except the
holder of the private key, but a private key is “something you have” authentication…and anything you
have can be stolen. This can be mitigated by practices such as credential rotation or the usage of
multiple secrets and it can have more protection against theft by using privately-signed Certificates from
the organizations own Certificate of Authority (CA) rather than a public CA. When used in conjunction
with TPM chips, X.509 certificates with strong management practices are the most robust security of our
data origination and destination [2]. Additionally, implement and use least-privilege administration and
configuration monitoring, such as Linux-based solutions like Ansible, Puppet, Chef and Microsoft Desired
State Configuration (DSC) and PowerShell concepts of Just In Time (JIT) Administration and Just Enough
Administration (JEA) [6].
Conclusion
Zero trust architecture is a system of principles and decisions and tools and planning that all
ultimately work together to underscore some fundamental assertions [2]:
●

The network is always hostile.
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●

External and Internal threats exist at all times and all around every system.

●

The historical paradigm of location within the network determining implicit trust is not enough.

●

Every user, asset, flow, resource subject will be authenticated and authorized.

●

Policies must be dynamic and ingest as many sources of data as possible to make trust decisions.

As we have discussed throughout this paper, zero trust is essentially a security paradigm for making
sure that people and entities attempting to connect to company resources are who they say they are,
which requires explicit authorization for every request after a comprehensive authentication exercise
and continuous monitoring of all activity to look for signs of unexpected activity. This goes far beyond
basic authentication of the old days when a username and password in Active Directory could get
someone access to any system on the network. This type of access management assumes that all users
are a threat, regardless of their identity, location or how they connect to a network (be it “inside” a
company network perimeter or remotely). It is important to note that zero trust is an evolution, not a
revolution [7]. William Malik, vice president of infrastructure strategies at Trend Micro, stated that
“Don’t try and buy your way to zero trust – set small goals, make sure it is rooted to removing un-earned
trust, and always ensure that you have visibility improvements” [7]. This is why my mind went to how to
build a framework and approach mechanism in this paper in order to create focus and priority in the
efforts that a company can use to build towards a zero trust future. Use the principles to make a plan to
implement, see what people and technology you need, measure along the objectives, and prioritize
progress to the goals. Building an architecture that never trusts and always verifies to grant access
explicitly and intentionally on a per-request basis and assumes every system is surrounded by
adversaries and a threat actor is active at all times leads to highly resilient, highly flexible environments
that are much better suited to the demands of the modern workplace of today and to prepare for the
threats of tomorrow [5].
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Creating a Zero Trust Architecture Framework
Introduction
In this section, I will present an application of the proposed framework which was referenced in
this research paper. I will include the definition of the Design Principles of zero trust, establish
Implementation Approaches, propose Techniques, and link them all to Objectives which will ultimately
support the Risk Management Strategy goals of an organization. By combining and defining zero trust
architecture principles with NIST cyber resiliency constructs and CISA maturity model assessment, I will
create a familiar, yet unique, guide for an organization to determine their logical path towards a zero
trust architecture.
Design Principles/Tenants
According to NIST SP 800-160v2, developing cyber resilient systems is founded in defining
structural and strategic design principles. These are the initial underlying principles which engineers and
architects can use to guide and inform design decisions and analysis [3]. From these principles, various
constructs build upon each other to ultimately achieve one or more of the four goals of resiliency:
Anticipate, Withstand, Recover, and Adapt. Zero trust architecture is not defined in the same way by
everyone who designs a system or does zero trust must have an agreed upon mechanism for measuring
“success”. Even beginning an initiative to embark on the journey of zero trust can come with varying
recommendations of where to begin. One authors’ recommendation might be to catalog all data flows
in the network while another might be to implement a centralized Identity and Access Management
(IAM) System. How a company and the architects and engineers inherently operate will greatly influence
what recommendations they follow, usually playing into a set of core competencies. If the architect is
skilled in inventory analysis then they may begin with data collection of assets and data flows. If the
engineer is very technically focused on implementing tools and knows that a centralized IAM would be
necessary for zero trust or thinks that full encryption of data at rest and in transit is part of zero trust,
14 | P a g e

they may begin with those types of technical implementations. Throughout my research of reading
books, articles, interviewing engineers who have “implemented” zero trust both as a professional
service provider to a customer and with Microsoft engineers who implemented their version of zero
trust for Microsoft’s own network, I have come to the conclusion and recommendation that the tenants
of zero trust as defined in NIST SP 800-207 [1] have a direct correlation to act as structural design
principles to underset building a framework using constructs as in NIST SP 800-160v2. Using these
tenants as design principles has allowed me to systematically build up through the various processes
and technologies that would be required to ultimately achieve the Risk Management Strategy goals of
an organization. See figure 3 for how the zero trust tenants of SP 800-207 correlate to cyber resiliency
structural design principles of SP 800-160v2.

Figure 3: NIST Zero Trust Tenants Mapped to NIST Structural Design Principles

Implementation Approaches and Techniques
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Depending on the prioritization of the certain objectives to meet the goals of zero trust
architecture, the design principles inform the selection and prioritization of what implementation
approaches to focus resources on and the techniques that ultimately will support the proper objectives.
Since most organizations will need to use a phased migration approach to zero trust and thus maintain
positive user experience and minimize employee frustration, choosing the implementation approaches
and techniques to best balance the migration to greater security yet minimizing impact to business
operations is critical. Every organization has their own interruption tolerance level and end user
technical aptitude, and these factors will also come into heavy consideration when selecting the
implementation approaches and techniques selected to move towards the goals defined by the
organization.
Correlation directly to cyber resiliency constructs of implementation approaches and techniques
is not as streamlined as observed for design principles, but in definition of these constructs and the
macro-level view of zero trust made creating and defining these for zero trust relatively straightforward.
The technology around zero trust is not necessarily “new”, but it is the systematic application of all of
the concepts working in unison that makes zero trust so unique. Many organizations have used and
practiced parts of the recommendations of zero trust for many years, so creating the implementation
approaches and techniques which would connect the design principles to the objectives is really only a
matter of bringing all of those parts together into creating a whole comprehensive solution.
Objectives
In designing a cyber resilient system, the objectives are where the progress and measurement to
the goals are tracked and measured. This is a critical construct area as it is here that the organization
must determine the correct balance of risk tolerance vs diminishing returns on investment in addition to
calculating the security investment value to risk mitigation. In this construct the organization measures
the progress to the Risk Management Strategy goals and, even at a basic level, must calculate if the
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investment in zero trust tools and processes is accomplishing the basic cybersecurity value-propositions
of cost reductions or revenue preservation. With no universal definition of zero trust objectives, it would
be left to the evaluation of the organization itself. In my research, matching seamlessly to the definition
of the “objectives” construct are the pillars of the CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model [4]. Every technical
and operational control I have researched as pertains to a zero trust implementation could be
categorized back to one of these maturity-model pillars as shown in figure 4 and application of various
techniques and approaches to the Objectives in figure 5.

Figure 4: CISA Maturity Model Pillars Redefined into Zero Trust Objectives
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Figure 5: Mapping of Zero Trust Objectives to Proposed Techniques and Approaches
Goals
What is the goal of zero trust? Some might say that it is to protect organizations from threats
and to protect the data that might be valuable to someone who is not supposed to have it, either to
steal or to exploit the company. An organization should not design their goals around zero trust by
checking boxes of technical accomplishment of what any vendor or article or periodical says is the
definition of “Zero Trust”. The organization needs to incrementally implement zero trust principles,
process changes, and technology solutions that protect its highest value data assets [1] and in order to
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do so, they must have a clearly defined Risk Management Strategy. The organization must know what
their valuable assets are in order to know which ones have the highest return on protecting. If the
company is attempting to protect everything in the organization, there is inevitably a point of
diminishing returns on that level of investment and an opportunity cost of resource focus away from the
most valuable assets and data to the org. Cybersecurity exists in order to manage risk, and the principles
of zero trust provide the guidance to apply capabilities to minimize that risk in such a comprehensive
manner it has not been seen before in this industry, but it not a magic bullet that will save the company
from everything and there is a treatment of risk that is very much applicable to any conversation
because to accept it is a much better business decision than the investment to mitigate it.

Implementing Zero Trust Architecture
Introduction
In this section, I will propose how an organization can take steps toward zero trust architecture
categorized by the objectives defined in the framework in the previous section. To conclude, I will test
this implementation against the “Identity Verification” Objective and measure how John Doe will access
various resources within an organization and how the framework ensures that the assertions of zero
trust architecture are applied.
Identity Verification
I recently went on a business trip to Redmond, Washington to meet with Microsoft engineers
and got the rare opportunity to talk with a cybersecurity architect and ask about how Microsoft
implements protections of and from their 500,000 pc’s, tablets, iPads, laptops, and mobile phones and
the people using them. What I observed was textbook best practices in some regards of implementing
the principles of zero trust and support of my defined objective of Identity Verification. Utilizing heavy
use of MFA, this particular architect was in possession of no less than four different smart cards used as
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the “something you have” component of MFA and each card had access to a varying level of system. In
addition to the authorization level provided by the presentation of the smart card, Microsoft utilizes
Microsoft Hello biometric logins and certificate-exchange PIN logins. They are exclusively passwordless,
demonstrating that adhering to the facets of MFA does not inherently assume one of those factors must
be a password. Using Conditional Access Policy, which also applies to the device they are using
(discussed in next section) the trust established for a users’ authentication and authorization is an
ingestion of a multitude of signals which ultimately allow for the policy enforcement to execute or block
the access request. The combination of these signal inputs and the conditional access policy can also
allow for machine learning to adopt user behaviors and apply those to the risk signals [8] incorporated
into the policy engines. For example, if a user has logged in on a certain device from a certain location
and only during working hours for a period of time and suddenly there is a request from that user on a
weekend from a location a thousand miles away, the policy has the knowledge to block the connection
or require a deeper level of authentication.
“Identity is the new perimeter” was my first easily understood definition of zero trust. This
tenant holds true but accomplishing zero trust takes more than just wrapping static security around
identity, it takes a level of dynamics to ensure that an identity is always challenged so that a
compromised identity could not proliferate very substantially. Credentials should ideally rotate between
every session so that an adversary cannot reuse credentials. It is critical that credentials be time-boxed
to minimize the blast radius of leaked or stolen keys and hashes and gives the subject an opportunity to
continuously reassert trust [2], which could also increase trust scores for some users enabling even
more efficient access in the future. Speaking of efficient access, Single Sign-On (SSO) is a common
efficiency mechanism implemented to pass-through credentials between systems and networks,
essentially passing implied trust from one system to the next. There is a centralized authority granting a
token which validates the subject and passes the authentication through and this is in conflict with the
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zero trust principle of decentralized authentication. In zero trust, it is the control plane that makes the
decisions on authentication and pushes the dynamic credential and access policy to the data plane [2].
In order to implement zero trust and constant authentication, but still receive the benefits of SSO, the
token must be passed through the control plane and re-authorized for every access request between
systems rather than simply passed from one system to the next system.
MFA is on the verge of a disruption that fits seamlessly into the future of zero trust, and that
disruption is what Gartner is naming Continuous Adaptive Trust (CAT). This evolution is not about two or
more factors provided that identify a user (MFA), but how credentials are combined with recognition,
affirmation, and risk signals to provide sufficient trust in an identity claim [9]. Claimed identity and
access risk can change dynamically throughout a session, so credentials and signals must be
continuously evaluated postlogin [9] and this is essential to maximize the protections afforded by
implementing zero trust. This CAT concept matches seamlessly with what Microsoft is doing with their
Conditional Access Policy. MFA is not required for every login, but can be invoked if necessary, as the
policy engine is ingesting and evaluating every identity, device, and risk signal that is being supplied by
the connection and running analytics on user behavior, session attributes, familiarity attributes, and
threat intelligence, and environmental context [9].
Device Verification
At the heart of every device, and a strategy that should be implemented in every organization of
every size, is the embedded TPM (Trusted Platform Module) chip on every server hardware and every
end user computing device. The presence of this cryptoprocessor is critical for device authentication in a
zero trust network. Why are they so critical? They allow for cryptographic operations yet have no
interface for retrieving private keys. So, when a TPM generates and stores a Storage Root Key (SRK) and
shares the public key, it can only be decrypted by the private key stored in that originating hardware
TPM. Asymmetric encryption is expensive and slower than symmetric, so the device will use a fast
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symmetric encryption such as AES to encrypt the bulk data, and then use the SRK to encrypt the
resulting AES key [2]. Additionally, authentication on any device requires the use of x.509 certificates
and the most secure storage for a particular device’s X.509 private key is within the storage backed by
the TPM. The marriage of TPM and X.509 certificates is foundational and critical to devices in a zero
trust environment.
Devices also contain attributes that must contribute information to the policy engine in a zero trust
network. Configuration of the device, applications installed on the device, physical location of the device
and how it is connecting to the Internet are all considerations which contribute to the device getting
authorization to connect to data sources. An organization can streamline management and capture of
these attributes with an implementation of an MDM (Mobile Device Management) or Endpoint
Management tool such as Microsoft Intune or Citrix Endpoint Management. Combining the
management of those devices with a Conditional Access Policy from Microsoft will allow for the granular
control of associating the static physical attributes of the device with dynamic point-in-time
environment attributes of the device to contribute to the policy administrator decisions to allow access
to certain data sources. For example, an employee laptop connected through a connected home
internet connection that meets all patching and configuration criteria will present a higher trust score
when requesting access to a company data source than that same laptop connecting over a free Wi-Fi
connection from a hotel lobby in a foreign country.
Network Protected
In the early days of cybersecurity, it was thought that a company needed to protect the
“network” to protect the company from cyberthreats. An evolution in the capabilities and motivations
of adversaries has taken the fight inside the network. This evolution has created the necessity for a
maturity of understanding what entails a network, what is “inside” that network, and how that network
is going to communicate. Networking technology applied correctly is pivotal to any zero trust
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architecture. Gone are the days of a single-segment corporate perimeter being sufficient and introduced
in zero trust is the implementation of microperimeters around the most granular of systems and
microsegmentation of discrete zones based on sensitivity of data or functions of the business. The most
valuable data in the world is useless if it cannot be moved, and the network is the catalyst to adding
value to data to get to the proper destination securely and begin transformation of data into
information and knowledge. The Network Protected objective is accomplished by implementing a
collective of existing technology, but in a novel way. Firewalls are still required, albeit they may separate
users from applications and applications from databases (east/west traffic) rather than just the
traditional corporate-from-DMZ-from-Internet (north/south). Even host-based firewalls directly on the
system should be implemented and enabled to further supplement any network firewalls. Many
periodicals suggest that mapping of network flows is the first step to take in implementing a zero trust
network, and although this statement may be accurate for some organizations depending on what they
have determined is their best implementation approach (Behavior Validation in the above framework),
there are many additional technical considerations to achieving this objective.
One of the most difficult concepts of zero trust to grasp (for me, at least) in how it would work
in operation is the concept that VPN is no longer necessary or valid if the organization has implemented
zero trust. VPN typically uses IPSec encrypted communication in tunnel mode establishing a secure
connection between two endpoints over the Internet. The termination point of an endpoint is a zone of
implied trust, thus negating one of the main tenets of zero trust. Using that existing technology, but in
transport mode and in higher volume so that the link goes directly to the destination endpoint rather
than an intermediary network device (i.e., firewall), creates a secure connection between the subject
and the data source thus rendering the location of either entity obsolete. Traditional VPN in tunnel
mode encapsulates the entire IP packet, but with more IPSec connections going directly to the endpoint
and creating more volume of data transfer and encryption/decryption overhead, using transport mode
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allows for only the payload to be encrypted, which still ensures that security is enforced from end to
end.
With network location now irrelevant, zero trust architecture requires we look more closely at the
communication and mechanisms needed for implementation and accomplishing the objective. IPSec is
recommended for server-to-server communications within the data center, as it relieves some of the
additional overhead and complexities that come with the recommendation of client-to-server
communication, mutually authenticated TLS. IPSec is not a single protocol, but a collection of protocols
and one of those protocols is the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) which is the protocol that performs the
authentication and key exchange components of IPSec [2]. Think of IKE as the control plane of IPsec and
this is where the X.509 certificate, again, is used to authenticate a peer and authorize a connection. In a
zero trust network, all devices should be using x.509 certificates issued ideally from a private Certificate
Authority (CA) that is offline rather than a public PKI (Public Key Infrastructure). X.509 certificates are
meant for all devices in the environment, not humans, as they carry proof of trust, signed metadata, and
a way to strongly encrypt data using its identity [2].
Client-to-server connections typically will run applications which use protocols that support TLS
(Transport layer Security) running at application layer 6 of the OSI model, whereas IPSec generally runs
at layer 3 or 4. This puts the encryption at the application rather than the session and is evident in
common web services using https and secure email, for example. In TLS, only the data source is
authenticated, but the client is not. This is why anyone on the Internet can access a website using
https…it verifies the destination, but the origin can be anyone. Although the communication to the
destination would be encrypted and protected with X.509 certificates, zero trust principles mandate that
the client is authenticated and authorized. To accomplish this, the handshake of a TLS connection will
verify and authenticate the client requesting the connection. This type of connection is referred to as
“mutually authenticated” TLS, or mTLS and is a requirement to conform to the zero trust model [2].
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Securing the network and the connections is covered and authenticating any device or user
requesting access to the network is covered, but both of these concepts have an assumption that that
connection did not meet interference or compromise while it was being created. So how does the
connection get created in a zero trust network before any of the above activity can take place? That
answer lies in Single Packet Authorization (SPA) and bootstrapping the trust of the proposed incoming
connection. SPA is a type of pre-authentication technology that works by sending a small piece of
encrypted data to a destination to set the expectation of the incoming secure TLS or SSH connection. A
common implementation is to use fwknop (firewall knock operator) which works by having a daemon
listen to UDP port 66201 on a firewall [10] (or reconfigured via command line) and when the packet is
received, decrypted, and inspected the payload includes the protocol and port numbers the subject is
requesting access to [2] which then creates the firewall rules permitting the requested connection. For
additional security, fkwnop can be configured to add an HMAC (Hashed Message Authentication Code)
to the end of its payload, which prevents tampering by guaranteeing that the message is authentic [2].
Application Workload Integrated
Every application in the organization must be protected as if it is directly connected to a very
hostile Internet, because it is. Legacy applications must receive connections via an application proxy
which provides the same protections and access justifications as modern applications built with zero
trust principles in mind. COTS (commercial off the shelf) and in-house developed applications must be
able to respond immediately to access executions and revocations the instant they are relayed the
proper information from the Policy Execution Point and do so in a secure manner utilizing valid X.509
certificates.
Application developers must ensure data integrity throughout the systems development
lifecycle by employing a secure repository which follows least access privilege principles. In a version
control system such as “Git” cryptographic hashes of ancestor commits must build on new commits to
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form a Merkle Tree, which allows for cryptographically validated assurance that the chain of commits is
unmodified [2] and signed with the GPG (GNU Privacy Guard) key of a trusted developer. The
development platform, such as Azure DevOps, must be connected to the build server over a secure TLS
channel and the build server should confirm all signatures before starting a build. Artifacts generated by
the build server should have immutable properties (write once, read many) before producing later
versions for distribution. The home source of truth for all developed applications must be afforded the
highest levels of protection.
API integrations are a seamless way for applications and services to interact and create valuable
access to information for organizations. A single organization can have hundreds of APIs to allow for
disparate applications to communicate and share data, but they can also be unprotected threat surfaces
prime for attack by an adversary. APIs need to be protected by least privilege principles and strong
identity management combined with micro-segmentation [11]. In an age of continuous
integration/continuous delivery (CI/CD) and the criticality of APIs, adding additional layers of security
can be an afterthought or a bolt-on. Implementing zero trust principles at the endpoints where APIs are
delivered at every stage of the SDLC and through promotion and connection to other APIs (which
communicate using the Network Protected implementation standards noted above) is critical to the
continued benefit of dynamic data integration in systems.
Data Protected
Almost every implementation approach and technique has a connection to the “data protected”
objective. Is this surprising? No, it is not surprising as data is at the core of what an organization is trying
to protect with any implementation of cybersecurity processes and tools. It is not necessarily the
physical server or the tablet or even the operating systems and applications that hold value to the
organization, but it is the data that those tools provide access to that requires protection. Data is the
target of an adversary’s goals of deny, deceive, disrupt, deter, or destroy because data is what creates
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information which converts to knowledge and knowledge is what is needed to run an organization and
knowledge transfer created into a tangible or intangible product is how the organization makes money.
In order to protect data in a zero trust architecture, systems must be employed that can provide
services no number of human eyes and hands could ever perform. Zero trust requires continuous
monitoring of all systems in the environment. All activity must be baselined for normalization trending
and configured to alert to anomalies. Advances in machine learning and artificial intelligence must be
utilized in ways to inform rapid information gathering and supplying to the control plane, policy engine
and trust engine. All authentication, transport, ingress, egress, and access activity on the network must
be logged and sent to a centralized SIEM for deeper analysis and alerting. Threat hunting feeds and
configuration vulnerability reports must be sent to the control plane in addition to the logs and
information from the SIEM. The control plane must be protected and treated as one of, if not the, most
critical systems in the environment since it acts as the gatekeeper to accessing every bit of critical data
within the organization.
Part of protecting data using least access privileges also incorporates change management. A
Request for Change (RFC) is a known security and configuration management best practice widely
adopted to enterprises worldwide. To maximize protection of data and elevate the maturity of the data
protection objective an organizations’ policy administrator should allow access authorizations to be
granted only during approved change windows. Access should be immediately revoked at the
termination of the change window and configuration of the changed system scanned and updated to
the Configuration Management Database (CMDB).
Test Case: John Doe
In this test case, John Doe is an employee of Rhino Analytics. He is working remotely from his
home using an employer-provided tablet and connecting to the corporate email and finance system. The
email system is hosted in Exchange Online and the finance system is hosted in the corporate data
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center. Using the framework above, I will demonstrate how John accesses these two company resources
via zero trust architecture and the following NIST Zero Trust Architecture tenants and my proposed
framework structural design principles:
●
●
●
●

●
●
●

All data sources and computing services are considered resources
All communication is secured regardless of network location
Access to individual enterprise resources is granted on a per-session basis
Access to resources is determined by dynamic policy—including the observable state of
client identity, application/service, and the requesting asset—and may include other
behavioral and environmental attributes
The enterprise monitors and measures the integrity and security posture of all owned and
associated assets
All resource authentication and authorization are dynamic and strictly enforced before
access is allowed
The enterprise collects as much information as possible about the current state of assets,
network infrastructure and communications and uses it to improve its security posture

John’s zero trust journey to access the company resources he needs begins immediately when he
powers up his company-owned tablet. That tablet contains an embedded TPM cryptoprocessor which
ensures that all activity on that device has maintained full integrity through the supply chain cycle of
construction and delivery and stores the private key to decrypt the encrypted key of bulk AES encryption
and the X.509 device private key. John attempts to log onto his tablet first by plugging in a YubiKey plugin hardware authenticator device and providing the facial recognition prompt sent to his cell phone by
FIDO2 [https://fidoalliance.org/fido2] certified SaaS authentication provider, Hypr.
As the tablet loads the Operating System and John’s profile, the Crowdstrike Falcon XDR, Splunk
SIEM, and Microsoft Intune agents load, establishing their secure SSH transport-mode encrypted
connections to their host services. John’s login activity and all activity he performs is now being
monitored and logged and sent to Rhino Analytics’ control plane for analysis by the policy engine, trust
engine, and policy administrator. First, John checks his email by initiating a secure TLS connection to the
SMTP servers of Microsoft Exchange Online. The Microsoft Conditional Access Policy evaluates John’s
location and the configuration of his tablet to ensure the latest updates are installed and he is an
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authorized geographic location before allowing the connection to the destination to retrieve his email.
As John is reading his email, he receives a file attachment from a peer. He opens this file and the file
opens in a sandboxed secure area of Microsoft’s CASB (Cloud Access Security Broker) to evaluate the
contents of the file to look for malicious code. Upon delivery of the contents of the file to John, his
system is performing another inspection on the contents of the file and the company control plane
initiates another verification of the configuration of John’s tablet and of John’s authentication
credentials to ensure these have not changed. These have not changed so John’s trust score has
increased by one.
Now that John has completed reading his emails, he now needs to access sensitive company
financial data serviced from an on-premise server in the data center at Rhino Analytics headquarters.
John opens his client application and the information is sent to the policy engine and the policy
administrator determines that John needs additional authentication in order to access the financial data
source. After providing a certificate-backed PIN number which provides the private key to the
destination applications-presented public key, the control plane sends a request to the financial
application for verification of its TPM module encryption status and x.509 certificate and once those are
authenticated, verifies the level access John is authorized for. Once the control plane has gathered all of
this information from both parties and determined that both identities match their claims and that
John’s request meets his level of authorization, the control plane informs the data plane to establish a
mutually authenticated TLS connection between John’s tablet at home and the company on-premise
financial application. Intermediary filtering by corporate perimeter firewalls and host firewalls on both
John’s client and the hosting server perform constant analysis and packet inspection (minus payload,
since that is encrypted) and continuously feed information which ultimately services the policy engine.
John completes his work in the financial application and terminates the connection and the control
plane again initiates a review of the configuration of John’s system and the financial system to look for
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changes, and John’s temporary credentials used for his access is destroyed so they can be re-created
again upon his next access request.
All of this secure activity was invisible to John and he was not hindered in any way to perform his job
functions. John is who he claims to be and is authorized to access all of the systems and data he
attempted to access, so his experience was streamlined and that is going to be critical to avoid causing
the business friction and create user defiance. To enable as seamless as possible user experience,
implementing zero trust is a journey and must be done iteratively to ensure the systems are built to
keep up with all the demand and execution on the decisions in near real-time in addition to not
preventing employees from performing the work they are expected to perform. In this simplified
example I was able to define how achieving every zero trust tenant was successful and how it
significantly protected the organization from any resource trying to perform any activity other than
those authorized and by anyone other than who they had to prove they are.
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